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THE ROLE OF JUDGE AND JURY IN DETERMINING A CONFESSION'S
VOLUNTARINESS
In recent years, there has been considerable
activity in formulating standards governing
the admission into evidence of confessions.' A
principal objective of this activity has been to
prevent the jury from considering an im-
properly obtained confession.2 However, in
addition to the standards themselves, the pro-
cedure by which these standards are applied
to a confession has a significant bearing upon
whether or not the defendant receives this
protection. Recent trends in the adoption of
procedures used to determine the admissibility
of confessions indicate that the defendant may
not be afforded adequate protection against
the use by the jury of an improperly obtained
confession.
ELEENTs OF ADMnssmLzTY
A basic requirement for the admission of a
confession is trustworthiness. This principle
recognizes that under certain circumstances an
innocent person will falsely admit guilt. The
' See e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936);
Ky. REv. STAT. § 422.110 (1953); TEX. CODE
Cmm. PRoc. Amx. art. 727 (1941); NAToNAL
CoMMgsIoSN ON LAW OBSERVATION AND ENFORCE-
aENT, No. 11, RzEPORT ON LAwLEssNEss IN LAW
Ei oacmmNT (1931).
2 These new standards have been criticized on the
grounds that they prohibit necessary police prac-
tices. See Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the
United Saes Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REv. 442,
447, (1948).
desire to exclude such untrustworthy confes-
sions is illustrated by the requirements of
certain courts that confessions be corroborated
and that independent proof of the corpus delicti
be offered.3 Dean Wigmore has stated that
trustworthiness is the sole principle involved in
the test for the admissibility of a confession4 .
However, another principle, similar to the
privilege against self-incrimination, may be
involved. Thus, even though a confession may
be corroborated by other evidence and may
therefore be trustworthy, some courts sense a
need for disciplining the police by protecting
the defendant from police abuses even though
they may not be so coercive as to make an inno-
cent person confess.5 The courts' preference for
3 See, e.g., Yost v. United States, 157 F.2d 147,
150 (4th Cir. 1946); Pate v. State, 63 So.2d 223,
224 (Ala. 1953).
43 Wi oRE, EvmExNc §§ 822, 823 (3d ed.
1940).
6Since courts feel that the fruits of an illegal
search must be suppressed as evidence in order to
discourage such searches, it is not surprising that
they exclude coerced confessions even when trust-
worthy. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 203 (1953): "But
if law officers learn that from now on they can co-
erce confessions without risk, since trial judges may
admit such confessions provided only that perhaps
through the very process of extorting them, other
evidence has been procured on which a conviction
can be sustained, police in the future even more so
than in the past will take the easy but ugly path
of the third degree."
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stating the confession rule in terms of "volun-
tariness" may be indicative of a desire to
exclude all involuntary confessions even when
they are trustworthy. 6 Therefore, decisions
concerning the admissibility of confessions are
best understood when it is agreed that two
principles are involved. The first is aimed at the
exclusion of untrustworthy evidence; the second
is directed at protecting an interest similar to
the privilege against self-incrimination.
PROCEDURES USED IN DETERMINING
ADMISSIBILITY
The two basic methods of determining the
admissibility of a confession are commonly
referred to as the orthodox and New York pro-
cedures. The most important difference between
these methods is that under the orthodox pro-
cedure the judge makes the final determination
of admissibility, while under the New York
method the jury makes this final determination.
The so-called orthodox procedure, which at
one time was the majority view, requires the
judge to hear, usually out of the jury's presence,
all the evidence relating to the voluntariness
of the confession. 7 He then must make a final
determination of whether the confession is
voluntary and will be received into evidence or
whether it is involuntary and will therefore be
excluded. The judge's conclusion on the issue of
voluntariness, under this procedure, will not
be re-examined by the jury. However, if the
confession is admitted, the jury may hear
evidence concerning its procurement in order
to determine its credibility. Frequently, the
jury will hear the same evidence regarding the
6 See, e.g., McCormick, The Scope of Privlege in
the Law of Evidence, 16 TEXAs L. REv. 447, 452-53
(1938).
7 See, e.g., Schaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d 17,
21 (5th Cir. 1955); State v. McCarthy, 133 Conn.
171, 177, 49 A.2d 594, 597 (1946); People v. Weber,
401 Ill. 584, 598, 83 N.E.2d 297, 305 (1948), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 969 (1949); CaudilU v. State, 224
Ind. 531, 538, 69 N.E.2d 549, 552 (1946); Andrews
v. State, 220 Miss. 28, 33, 70 So.2d 40, 42 (1954);
State v. Craig, 9 N.J. Super. 18, 23, 74 A.2d 617,
620 (1950).
issue of credibility as the judge heard in deter-
mining the confession's admissibility. 8
The question of voluntarincss, for deter-
mining admissibility, and the question of
credibility, for determining guilt, are related
but nevertheless distinct issues. However,
courts often seem to confuse the two and speak
of them as being oiie and the same question. 9
Both are concerned, of course, with the trust-
worthiness of the confession. The question of
voluntariness, however, is generally limited to a
consideration of the circumstances surrounding
the procurement of the confession." Credibil-
ity, on the other hand, requires an examination
of all elements which bear on the accuracy of
the confession. An important distinction be-
tween the two issues is illustrated by the fact
that an involuntary confession may be highly
credible when corroborated by independent
evidence. On the other hand, a voluntary
confession may not be credible where it is a
product of one's imagination or if it is made to
serve as an alibi for a more serious crime."
Under the New York procedure, which now
represents the majority view, the judge, usually
in the presence of the jury, initially hears
evidence surrounding the making of the con-
8 In those jurisdictions where the judge makes
his determination of admissibility in the absence of
the jury the same evidence must often be presented
twice. While this is time consuming, most orthodox
jurisdictions believe such a practice necessary to
prevent the jury from being influenced by hearing
evidence relating to an inadmissible confession.
9 For example,"... submitting the issue of volun-
tariness to the jury for their consideration in deter-
mining what credibility, if any, they would accord
the confessions." Brown v. United States, 228 F.2d
286, 289 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 986 (1956);
Shepherd v. State, 31 Neb. 389, 392, 47 N.W. 1118,
1119 (1891).
10 See, e.g., People v. Fudge, 342 Ill. 574, 586-87,
174 N.E. 875, 880 (1931); Humphries v. State, 181
Miss. 325, 331, 179 So. 561, 563-64 (1938); 3 WIG-
moRE, EVIDENCE § 861 (3d ed. 1940).
11 For instance, a man might commit a murder in
a certain part of the town and confess to a burglary
in a distant portion of the town in order to establish
an alibi. See BuRTT, LEGAL PSYCHOLO.GY, 174 (1931).
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fession. 12 If the only possible finding is that the
confession was involuntary the judge must
exclude the confession. 13 Where the judge
concludes that only a finding of voluntariness
is possiile, some jurisdictions allow his deter-
mination to be final.14 In others, however, the
judge is required to re-submit the question of
voluntariness to the jury.1 Where the judge
determines that the testimony presents con-
flicting evidence, the issue of voluntariness is
submitted to the jury without any prior deter-
mination by the court.16 The jury is then
instructed to disregard the confession if they
find it involuntary.17 If they find it voluntary
2See, e.g., Duncan v. United States, 197 F.2d
935, 937-38, (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 885
(1952); Barnes v. State, 217 Ark. 244,249,229 S.W.-
2d 484, 486 (1950); Downs v. State, 208 Ga. 619,
621, 68 S.E.2d 568,570 (1952); People v. Fernandez,
301 N.Y. 302, 326, 93 N.E.2d 859, 872 (1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 914 (1951); Commonwealth v.
Narr, 173 Pa. Super. 148, 151, 96 A.2d 155, 156
(1953); Newman v. State, 148 Tex. Crim. 645, 660-
61, 187 S.W.2d 559, 567-68 (1945).
1 See, e.g., People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 364,
98 N.E.2d 553, 558-59 (1951). •
1 See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 189 F.2d
693, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1951), which illustrates the
attitude of a court following the New York rule that
where there is no evidence rebutting the voluntary
nature of the confession it is unnecessary for the
court to submit the question to the jury.
' See, e.g., People v. Pignatoro, 263 N.Y. 229,
240-41, 188 N.E. 720, 724 (1934), where the court
found error in the trial judge's determining that a
confessfon was voluntary as a matter of law even
though there was neither evidence of fear nor claim
of coercion by the defendant.
16 The practice of instructing the jury to apply
legal tests of admissibility to the confession rather
than merely weighing its intrinsic value has been
characterized as a "grave blunder." See 9 WIGmORE,
EvDENCE § 2550 (3d ed. 1940). See also 3 id.
§ 861.
'7 There is a wide variation of instructions em-
ployed by trial courts in this situation. Compare
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 173 n.17 (1953),
where the trial court charged the jury that, "you
must find beyond a reasonable doubt that these con-
fessions, or either of them, was a voluntary one be-
fore you would have a right to consider either of
they are to consider it along with the other
evidence in reaching their verdict. Thus, under
the New York method, the jury determines
voluntariness when conflicting evidence is
presented, while under the orthodox procedure
the judge makes this determination.
A reason for the development of the New
York procedure may be found in the history of
the courts' use of confessions. 18 Transferring
the admissibility question from the judge to
the jury may well have been a reaction to the
strict exclusionary attitude of nineteenth cen-
tury judges.19 In addition, the growth of the
New York rule is partially accounted for by the
them" -ilh Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143,
146 (1944), where the trial court charged the jury
that, "if verbal or written statements made by the
defendants freely and voluntarily and without fear
of punishment or hope of reward, have been proven
to you..."
Is In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there
was no doctrine of excluding involuntary confes-
sions. All admissions of guilt were accepted without
question as to whether or not they were motivated
by threats or actual physical violence. The confes-
sion was considered a plea of guilty dispensing with
the need for further evidence of guilt. During the
eighteenth century exclusionary rules began to de-
velop. The earliest statement of the modem rule
appears in this period. In Warickshall's Case, 1
Leach C.L. 263, 264, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (1783),
the court said, ". . . a confession forced from the
mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of
fear, comes in so questionable a shape when it is to
be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no
credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is
rejected." Judges became more suspicious of con-
fessions during the nineteenth century and excluded
them on the slightest grounds. See 3 WNIGUORE,
Evmz.rcE § 865 (3d ed. 1940), for reasons for this
seemingly oversentimental attitude.
19 For example, confessions were excluded when
the accused was advised to tell the truth. See Har-
den v.State, 66 Ark. 53, 62, 48 S.W. 904, 907 (1898);
Regina v. Heam, Car. & M. 109, 174 Eng. Rep.
431 (N.P. 1841). In addition, confessions were ex-
cluded when the defendant was warned that what
he said would be used against him. The theory was
that this would encourage the defendant to make a
statement which he would consider favorable to his
cause. See Regina v. Harris, 1 Cox C.C. 106 (1844).
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practice, followed by some courts, of submitting
the voluntariness issue to the jury under the
guise of having the jury determine the credi-
bility of the confession.20 This practice is
supported by the belief that the jury, rather
than the judge, is to determine all questions of
fact.2'
There is one widely adopted variation of the
New York rule. This is the so-called humane or
Massachusetts procedure.Y This method com-
bines portions of both the orthodox and New
York views. The judge, under this procedure,
hears evidence, usually in the presence of the
jury, concerning the procurement of the con-
fession and makes an initial determination of
its admissibility. If the judge is of the opinion
that the confession is involuntary, even
when there is conflicting evidence, it is ex-
cluded as under the orthodox practice. If, on
the other hand, the judge decides that the
confession is voluntary, the issue of voluntari-
ness is nevertheless submitted to the jury to be
re-examined as under the New York procedure.
Thus, the Massachusetts rule theoretically
affords the defendant two separate determina-
tions of voluntariness. The difference between
the New York and the Massachusetts views is
21 See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 228 F.2d 286,
289 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 986 (1956);
State v. Cleveland, 6 N.J. 316, 326, 78 A.2d 560,
565 (1951).
21 In New York, for example, it has been said
that for the judge to determine a question of fact
concerning the voluntary nature of a confession
would be "going very far indeed toward usurping
the functions of a jury, bordering almost on arbi-
trary action." People v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409, 418,
159 N.E. 379, 382 (1927). Contra, 9 WiGmopx,
EVmENcE § 2550 (3d ed. 1940), where the author
endorsed the principle that where admissibility de-
pends upon an incidental question of fact, such as
whether threats were used to obtain a confession,
that issue is for the judge to determine before ad-
mitting the evidence to the jury.
21 See, e.g., Tillotson v. United States, 231 F.2d
736, 739, (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989
(1956); Bruner v. People, 113 Colo. 194, 217, 156
P.2d 111, 122 (1945); Commonwealth v. Sheppard,
313 Mass. 590, 604, 48 N.E.2d 630, 639, cert. denied,
320 U.S. 213 (1943); People v. Louzon, 338 Mich.
146, 150-53, 61 N.W.2d 52, 55 (1953).
that under the former the confession is always
admitted when the evidence surrounding the
procurement of the confession is in conflict;
under the latter, the confession is only admitted
when the judge determines the conflict in
favor of the prosecution.
In addition to the allocation of functions
between judge and jury, the defendant's pro-
tection against the use of an involuntary con-
fession is often dependent upon his right to
have the jury excluded during the preliminary
hearing upon the admissibility of the confes-
sion. Generally, in orthodox jurisdictions, the
exclusion of the jury is required or at least
recommended.2 3 In jurisdictions following the
New York or Massachusetts views there is
usually no preliminary hearing held in the
absence of the jury because the jury itself must
eventually make the final determination of
voluntariness2 4
METHODS USED IX THE FEDERAL COURTS
There is no uniform procedure followed by
the federal courts. On the contrary, there is
considerable disagreement as to what is the
proper method. The conflict over what is or
should be the federal procedure apparently
stems from the United States Supreme Court's
discussion of a proper procedure in Wilson v.
United States. There the Court said, "When
there is a conflict of evidence as to whether a
confession is or is not voluntary, if the court
decides that it is admissible, the question may
be left to the jury with the direction that they
should reject the confession if upon the whole
evidence they are not satisfied it was not the
voluntary act of the defendant." Dean Wig-
more interpreted this statement as rejecting
2 See, e.g., Espinola v. State, 82 So.2d 601, 602
(Fla. 1955); State v. Green, 221 La. 713, 730-31,
60 So.2d 208, 213 (1952). See also note 37 infra.
21 See, e.g., Ramirez v. State, 55 Ariz. 441, 450,
103 P.2d 459, 462 (1940). In this case it was held
not error for the trialhourt to refuse to hear evidence
concerning voluntariness in the absence of the jury
because the final decision on that question
could be left to the jury. Contra, State v. Schabert,
218 Minn. 2, 8, 15 N.W.2d 585, 588-89 (1944).
See also note 36 infra.
25 162 U.S. 613, 624 (1896).
[Vol. 48
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the orthodox rule2 This is a reasonable inter-
pretation, since the Court was apparently
referring to the Massachusetts procedure.
However, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has construed this statement as author-
izing the orthodox ruleY The Second Circuit
concluded that the Supreme Court intended
that the jury pass on the credibility of the
confession rather than on its admissibility.
Other federal courts, often citing the Wilson
case, have at various times approved the
orthodox,2" New York or Massachusetts30
procedures.
THE BETTER PROCEDURE
A court following the orthodox rule treats a
confession no differently than any other type
of evidence. The judge, under this view, deter-
mines whether the particular evidence has
sufficient value to warrant its submission to the
jury.3 In determining the admissibility of any
evidence the judge at times must necessarily
decide a question of fact. The New York rule,
in contrast to the orthodox view, requires the
submission of such a fact question to the jury.
26 3 WioGRoE, EvmDEuc § 861 n.3 (3d ed. 1940).
The author does not distinguish between the New
York and Massachusetts rules.
2 United States v. Lustig, 163 F.2d 85, 89 (2d
Cir.), ceri. denied, 332 U.S. 812 (1947).
28 See, e.g., Schaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d 17,
21 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v. Lustig, 163
F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 812
(1947); Pon Wing Quong v. United States, 111
F.2d 751, 757 (9th Cir. 1940).
29See, e.g., Duncan v. United States, 197 F.2d
935, 938 (5th Cir.), cet. denied, 344 U.S. 885 (1952);
Tyler v. United States, 193 F.2d 24, 28 (D.C. Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 908 (1952); Catoe v.
United States, 131 F.2d 16, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
30 See, e.g., Tillotson v. United States, 231 F.2d
736, 739 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989
(1956); Patterson v. United States, 183 F.2d 687,
689-90 (5th Cir. 1950).
31 Some of the trial conditions that make it nec-
essary to limit the evidence admitted to the jury
are: (1) limitations on time and space, (2) risk of
fraud, (3) lay personnel of the jury, (4) emotional
conditions of litigation. These conditions are dis-
cussed at length in WIGmoRE, Thr ScIENcE or
JUDIc. PRooi, 925-32 (3d ed. 1937).
The jury must then determine both the ques-
tion of voluntariness and the credibility of the
confession. For this reason, an application of
the New York rule requires a complicated jury
instruction. In addition, since the jury must
determine both the admissibility and the
credibility of the evidence when they retire to
reach their verdict, they may well be unable to
separate these issues. The jury might then use
a confession in reaching their verdict without
ever determining whether it was admissible.
The judge, on the other hand, through training
and experience, should be better qualified to
apply the rules of admissibility to a confession.
In addition, the judge has always ruled upon
the availability of the privilege against self-
incrimination.n Since a similar element may be
involved in the issue of voluntariness,n that too
should properly be a question for the judge
rather than the jury. Moreover, the judge is
more apt to be aware of the strength of the
prosecutor's desire for a conviction and of the
police methods used in obtaining a confession.m
For these reasons, the defendant is given more
protection when the judge makes the final
determination of admissibility as under the
orthodox procedure.
Furthermore, under the New York rule, even
if the jury rejects the confession as involuntary,
the defendant is not protected against its use
unless the jurors are able to disregard all its
details in reaching their verdict." This may be
2 WIo Gxo, EVFiDENCE § 2271 (3d ed. 1940).
3 See text at note 5 supra.
34 This does not mean the judge will only be con-
cerned with illegal police methods. He would be
aware that certain psychological interrogation tech-
niques are legal while a jury might feel that they
were extremely unfair. See INBAu & Rzm, LE
Dr i ON Am CR ImnAL NTrROGATION 151-87
(3d ed. 1953).
3 Mr. Justice Jackson, in expressing doubt about
the jury's ability to disregard after such instruc-
tions, has said, "the naive assumption that prejudi-
cial effects can be overcome by instructions to the
jury ... all practicing lawyers know to be unmiti-
gated fiction." Krulewitch v. United States, 336
U.S. 440, 453 (1949). See also United States v.
Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 656 (2d Cir.
1946) (dissenting opinion), where instructions to
19571
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particularly diflicult where a brutal crime has
aroused the press and public. One would
imagine that coerced confessions are most
frequently found in connection with such a
crime. Thus, where the defendant needs the
most protection, he may well have the least.
Moreover, while the New York rule is based
upon the assumption that the jury will ignore
a confession which they find to be involuntary,
even the courts that follow this procedure
sometimes appear to doubt the jury's ability to
do so. Such doubt is illustrated by the practice,
followed by some New York rule jurisdictions,
of dismissing the jury from the judge's pre-
liminary hearing on the voluntariness ques-
tion."6 If the jury were able to disregard a
confession they themselves might find involun-
tary, they should be just as able to disregard a
confession that the judge finds involuntary.
In contrast, the question of the jury's ability
to disregard an involuntary confession is of
slight importance under the orthodox rule since,
under this view, the jury ordinarily does not
hear a confession until it has been found
voluntary by the judge. 37
disregard were likened to Mark Twain's story of a
boy who was told to stand in the corner and not
think of a white elephant.
3 See State v. Schabert, 218 Minn. 2, 8, 15 N.W.
2d 585, 588-89 (1944), where the court declared,
"the proper practice upon a challenge to the volun-
tary character of a confession is for the trial court,
in the absence of the jury, to hear the evidence of
both parties relating to its voluntary character...
If it concludes that the evidence is conclusive that
the confession was involuntary, it should be ex-
cluded. If, on the other hand, there is a question of
fact presented ... the evidence should be presented
to the jury... the jury should be instructed to
wholly disregard the confession if it concludes that
it was involuntary."
37 The defendant has grounds for a mistrial if the
jury is not withdrawn and the judge rules the con-
fession inadmissible. But if the confession is ad-
mitted the defendant is not injured for the jury
would bd entitled to hear it. See Espinola v. State,
82 So.2d 601, 602 (Fla. 1955); State v. Green, 221
La. 713, 730-31, 60 So.2d 208, 213 (1952). But see
State v. Kelly, 28 Ore. 225, 226-29, 42 Pac. 217-18
(1895) for an unusual holding by an orthodox rule
court that an inadmissible confession heard by the
jury was not prejudicial error.
Under the New York procedure, all the
prosecution need show in order to have the
confession submitted to the jury is a conflict of
evidence on the voluntariness issue. A conflict is
presented when an officer denies extorting the
confession. It is to be expected that an officer
who is willing to use illegal methods to obtain a
confession would frequently be willing to deny
the use of such methods.36 Furthermore, in a
New York rule jurisdiction, the judge must
admit a confession where there is a conflict in
evidence even if he is personally convinced that
the confession was coerced.
The Massachusetts variation, on the other
hand, appears to offer the defendant protection
from this result. The judge, under this view,
may resolve conflicting evidence by excluding
a confession. However, if the judge allows the
confession to be received, the jury then con-
siders the voluntariness question. For this
reason, it would not be surprising if a judge
would resolve close cases in favor of admissi-
bility in order to avoid responsibility for
making the final decision.3 9 Should all such
difficult decisions be passed on to the jury, the
Massachusetts variation would not differ sub-
stantially from the New York procedure. The
defendant would thereby find himself deprived
of the protection that led to calling this varia-
tion the "humane" rule, namely, that he is
entitled to two distinct determinations of the
voluntariness issue.
The fact that the orthodox procedure pro-
vides the defendant with a clear-cut determina-
tion of the voluntariness issue is particularly
valuable to him on motion for a new trial or on
appeal to a higher court. Where questions of
admissibility and credibility are both presented
to the jury and they return a general verdict,
it is difficult for the defendant or the appellate
court to know the effect of the preliminary
33 The attitude of such an officer would probably
be that "the end justifies the perjury if it justifies
the brutality." McCormick, Some Problems and De-
velopments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24
TE xAs L. REv. 250 (1946).
1 Such a criticism could also be leveled against
the orthodox rule. An irresponsible judge could ad-
mit a questionable confession and rely on the jury
to weigh it in accordance with its credibility.
[Vol. 48
